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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee/
Respondent,
v.
ROGER L. STRADER,
Case No. 940244-CA
Defendant/Appellant/
Petitioner.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant/Petitioner,

Roger

L.

Strader,

files

this

Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

Mr. Strader continues to assert that the offenses he

was charged with arose under a single criminal episode, and he is
entitled to dismissal of the theft and possession charges by virtue
of the prior prosecution of the false information charge.

Mr.

Strader relies on his previously filed opening brief and reply in
support of this contention.
This petition only addresses perceived flaws in the legal
analysis utilized by this Court in its opinion, without rearguing
Mr. Strader's underlying premise.

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Rule 11 (i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
(i) With approval of the court and the consent
of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional
plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest,
reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the
judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any
specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on
appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.

Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides:
All laws of
operation.

a

general

nature

shall

have

Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment

uniform

to the United

States Constitution provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

ISSUES OF LAW WHICH NEED TO BE READDRESSED
1.

The opinion incorrectly implies that when reviewing

issues preserved pursuant to a conditional guilty plea, the terms
of the conditional plea bargain struck may in some fashion render
moot one or more issues raised in the reserved motion.

The opinion

erroneously fails to address whether the theft charge should have
been dismissed by virtue of the prior prosecution on the false
information charge.

2.

This claim must be addressed.

The opinion incorrectly

sets forth a bifurcated

standard for assessing claims under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402(2)
and

76-1-403(1),

whereby

the

statutes

are

given

a

narrow

interpretation when assessing claims of defendants and an expansive
interpretation when assessing the claims of the prosecution, in
violation of Mr. Strader's right to equal protection of the laws
2

under the fourteenth amendment and right to uniform operation of
laws under article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE MERITS OF ISSUES PRESERVED PURSUANT
TO CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEAS UNDER SERY AND
RULE 11(i) ARE UNAFFECTED BY THE TERMS OF THE
CONDITIONAL PLEA AGREEMENT REACHED.
In its opinion, this Court stated:
Because the theft charge was ultimately
dismissed as part of the plea arrangement, the sole issue
for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in
refusing to dismiss the charge of possession of a
controlled substance, based on its determination that the
charge did not arise from the same criminal episode as
the previously prosecuted charge of giving false
identification to a police officer.
State v. Strader, No. 940244-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App., August
31, 1995) (Addendum A ) .

To the contrary, this Court was required

to address all issues preserved by Mr. Strader's conditional guilty
plea.

The individual terms of the plea agreement struck have no

bearing on the preserved issues raised on appeal.
A.

NEITHER RULE 11 (i) NOR CONDITIONAL PLEA
CASE LAW PROVIDE THAT REVIEW OF A
PRESERVED ISSUE IS IN ANY WAY LIMITED BY
THE CONDITIONAL PLEA STRUCK.

If a defendant prevails on appeal from a conditional
guilty plea, the defendant is permitted to withdraw his or her
plea.

Rule 11(i) .

After the conditional plea is withdrawn, the

original charges would again be pending.

Thus, the theft charge

against Mr. Strader remains dismissed only if his appeal is not
meritorious; if any aspect of his appeal is meritorious, then he is
permitted

to

withdraw

his

plea
3

and

proceed

to

trial

on

the

reinstated charges of theft and possession (to whatever extent the
appellate decision did not bar prosecution).
In cases that proceed to trial where an acquittal has
been entered on a charge, any pretrial issue concerning only that
charge is moot, as double jeopardy considerations preclude further
prosecution on that charge.

But because the charges dismissed as

part of a conditional plea will be reinstated if the appeal is
successful and the plea withdrawn, the terms of the plea agreement
cannot render any portion of the preserved issues moot.
This Court did not directly address whether the theft
charge should have been dismissed.

If on the merits this Court

were to determine that the theft charge should have been dismissed,
regardless of the result with respect to the possession charge, Mr.
Strader would be the prevailing party on appeal.

He would be

entitled to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial on what remained
of the case. This Court's reasoning and failure to reach the issue
of whether the theft charge should have been dismissed has deprived
Mr. Strader of the benefit of a determination of this issue on
appeal, as promised and guaranteed by his conditional plea bargain.
By

this

Court's

reasoning,

if Mr.

Strader

had

been

offered a conditional plea to a second charge of false information
(with dismissal of both the theft and possession charges) , then the
entire appeal would have been moot -- the possession and theft
charges would have been dismissed as part of the plea bargain.
This

incorrect

interpretation

of

the

conditional

guilty

plea

procedure places unwarranted restrictions on conditional guilty
4

pleas

not

justified

by

conditional plea practice.

Rule

11 (i)

or

case

law

interpreting

Pretrial rulings preserved pursuant to

conditional guilty pleas should be reviewed in their entirety on
appeal, without reference to the plea bargain struck.
B.

THE REASONING APPLIED HERE WOULD OPERATE
AS A PROCEDURAL BAR TO REINSTATEMENT OF
CHARGES WHEN A DEFENDANT'S APPEAL OF A
PRESERVED ISSUE IS SUCCESSFUL, AND THE
CONDITIONAL PLEA IS WITHDRAWN.

An appellate matter can only be moot if the issue cannot
arise again.

Thus, as a matter of logical consistency,

this

Court's ruling ipso facto requires that charges dismissed pursuant
to a conditional guilty plea may not be pursued, even after success
on appeal and withdrawal of that plea.

Appellant does not believe

that this new procedural bar inuring to the benefit of defendants
was considered or intended by the Court, but it follows as a
necessary incident to the analysis employed in the Strader opinion.
This Court should rehear whether Mr. Strader's theft
conviction

was

barred

by

the prior

prosecution

of

the

false

information charge, address that claim on the merits, and issue a
revised opinion accordingly.

POINT

II.
THIS COURT'S ADOPTION OF A DOUBLE
STANDARD IN INTERPRETATION OF §§ 76-1-402(2)
AND 76-1-403(1) VIOLATES MR. STRADER'S RIGHTS
TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS AND UNIFORM
OPERATION OF LAWS UNDER THE STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS.

In the

"Scope of Analysis"

section

of

this

Court's

opinion, the majority adopts a double standard for interpreting
claims under §§ 76-1-402(2) and 76-1-403(1):
5

An expansive interpretation of "single criminal
episode" is appropriate in cases contesting joinder of
multiple offenses. Rule 9.5, section 76-1-402(2), and
section 76-1-403(1), while related to double jeopardy,"
expand the scope of offenses barred from multiple trials
beyond "the same offense" focus in double jeopardy [cite
omitted] , to all offenses arising from a "single criminal
episode.""
An expansive interpretation promotes the
general joinder intent of Rule 9.5 and relevant statutes,
i.e., to avoid subjecting the defendant to separate
trials and to promote judicial economy.[1
...
On the other hand, the protection against
double jeopardy is a fundamental constitutional right
which prevents a defendant from being tried more than
once for the same crime.
U.S. Const, amend. V; Utah
Const, art. I, § 1 2 . Accordingly, review of a double
jeopardy issue employs a very narrow perspective,
focusing on whether a subsequent prosecution is for the
same offense without regard to whether multiple offenses
were part of the same criminal episode. [cites omitted] .
On balance, the circumstances of Strader's
claim place this case closer to a double jeopardy
analysis than to a joinder of offenses analysis."
Strader, slip op. at 4-6

(Orme and Jackson, JJ., with Davis, J.,

concurring in the judgment but dissenting from this holding) . The
application of a "very narrow perspective" to Mr. Strader's claims,
which

arise

under

statutes

usually

given

an

"expansive

interpretation," violates equal protection and uniform application
of laws.
A.

NOTHING ON THE FACE OF §§ 76-1-401 ET
SEQ. WARRANTS APPLICATION OF A BIFURCATED
STANDARD FOR INTERPRETATION BASED ON THE
PARTY SEEKING RELIEF.

The bifurcated

standard

adopted

in this opinion

for

interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 et seq. , based on
which party is seeking application of the statute, is not warranted
by the plain language of the statutes.

Nothing on the face of the

statutes provides grounds for holding defendants to a stricter

6

standard

than

the

State.

Such

a

judicial

interpretation

is

violative of equal protection and due process.
The right to equal protection applies not only with
respect to legislative enactments, but also to judicial actions.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948)
(court action in enforcing racial restrictive covenant constitutes
state action for fourteenth amendment purposes); Tassian v. People,
731 P.2d 672, 674 & n.4, (Colo. 1987)

(striking down court rule

disallowing acceptance of personal checks from pro se litigants).
This Court's opinion, and the rule of law it announces, accords
disparate treatment to two distinct groups of litigants:

criminal

defendants, on the one hand, and the prosecutorial entities that
prosecute them, on the other hand.

The plain language of the

statutes at issue justifies no such arbitrary distinction between
these classes of litigants.
B.

THIS COURT'S DOUBLE STANDARD SUBVERTS THE
PURPOSES AND OBJECTS RULE 9.5, §§ 76-1401 ET SEQ., AND THE CRIMINAL CODE IN
GENERAL.

In its opinion, this Court correctly noted that

"an

expansive interpretation promotes the general joinder intent of
Rule 9.5

and relevant statutes, i.e., to avoid subjecting the

defendant to separate trials and to promote judicial economy."
Strader, slip op. at 5-6.
intent

of

the

While paying lip service to this obvious

statutes, this

Court

inexplicably

ignores

this

legislative intent by determining that a very narrow construction
is both necessary and appropriate when criminal defendants seek
relief under the statutes.
7

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1995) states:
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly
construed shall not apply to this code, any of its
provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this
state. All provisions of this code and offenses defined
by the laws of this state shall be construed according to
the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to
effect the objects of the law and general purposed of
Section 76-1-104.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104(4) (1995), in turn provides that one of
the purposes of the code is to " [p]revent arbitrary or oppressive
treatment of persons accused or convicted of offenses."
Contrary to the express mandate of § 76-1-106, this Court
has ruled that §§ 76-1-401 et seq. are to be strictly construed.
This further subverts one of the criminal code purposes set forth
in § 76-1-104(4), to prevent arbitrary and oppressive treatment of
Mr. Strader by multiple prosecutions in multiple forums.

This

Court is not at liberty to substitute its own judgment for that of
the legislature.

State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 362 (Utah 1995) .

While it might have been appropriate for the legislature
to

leave

questions

of

joinder

in the

sole discretion

prosecuting entity, the legislature declined to do so.

of

the

Sections

76-1-401 et sequitur, in conjunction with Rule 9.5, establish a
comprehensive statutory scheme governing the joinder of charges in
criminal

cases.

This

Court's

judicial

construction

of

those

statutes has resulted in the substitution of this Court's judgment,
that prosecutors should have wide discretion in the manner in which
criminal charges arising from a single criminal episode are filed,
for the judgment of the legislature, that all charges should be
brought in a single proceeding.
8

11

[A] statute which, when properly applied would be fair

and consistent in application, may nevertheless be applied in such
a discriminatory manner as to violate constitutional guarantees of
equal protection of the law and nondiscrimination, in which case
relief should be granted to one aggrieved by such discriminatory
application."

Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391, 396

(Utah 1964) .

This Court should rehear this case, and issue an

opinion indicating that

§§ 76-1-401 et seq. are subject to a

uniform judicial interpretation regardless of the party seeking
relief thereunder.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Strader respectfully requests
that this Court rehear this case and issue an amended opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/ttt

day of September, 1995.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

DAVID P. S. MACK
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 23 6
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

Hit

day of

September, 1995.

4M—
Robert K. Heineman

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of September, 1995.
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ADDENDUM A
State v. Strader, No. 940244-CA (Utah App. 1995)

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RLED
AUG 3 1 1995

COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo

OPINION
(For P u b l i c a t i o n )

S t a t e of Utah,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l e e ,

Case No. 940244-CA

v.
Roger L. Strader,

F I L E D
(August 31, 1995)

Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki
Attorneys:

Robert K. Heineman and David P.S. Mack, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Kris Leonard and Jan Graham, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Jackson.
ORME, Presiding Judge:
Defendant Roger L. Strader pled guilty to possession of a
controlled substance, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (1994), but retained his right to appeal the trial
court's denial of his motion to dismiss. See State v. Serv. 758
P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988). Strader claims on appeal that
his prior prosecution on a different charge arising from the same
criminal episode precludes his prosecution for possession of a
controlled substance. We affirm.
FACTS
The facts of this case are undisputed. On the night of July
21, 1992, Officer Jerry Randall of the West Valley Police
Department was preparing paperwork while sitting in his patrol
car in a parking lot at 3900 West and 3*390 South. At
approximately 11:00 p.m., he observed a vehicle pull into an
adjacent construction site. A man, later identified as Strader,
exited the vehicle, entered a building on the site,"* returned
carrying an object which he placed in the vehicle, and drove

away. Officer Randall stopped the vehicle and asked Strader, who
was driving, for identification.
Strader stated he had no identification, but gave his name
as Stanley Kent Strader. After Officer Randall questioned him
about the object in the back seat, a circular saw, Strader said
he was picking it up for a friend named Tony Ochoa. Strader's
female passenger left the scene to retrieve his identification
from their nearby apartment. Another man, professing to be Tony
Ochoa, returned with a driver's license issued to Earl Nesbitt,
which contained a picture resembling Strader. However, the
license had obviously been altered. The top lamination layer had
been peeled back to allow insertion of Strader's picture.
Officer Randall placed Strader under arrest for giving false
information to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1995). After a check on
the vehicle's license plates revealed that the plates belonged to
another vehicle, Officer Randall impounded the vehicle. In the
course of the ensuing inventory search, Officer Randall found a
loaded syringe under the driver's seat and a packet of syringes
in the glove compartment. A canine unit discovered another
syringe under a seat cover. Subsequent tests revealed that some
of the syringes contained methamphetamine. Meanwhile, another
officer found the owner of the circular saw, who identified it as
property stolen from him.
Strader was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail on three
charges: giving false identification to a police officer, a
class C misdemeanor; theft, a class A misdemeanor; and possession
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. He was
subsequently charged by the West Valley City prosecutor with the
misdemeanor false identification offense. He entered a guilty
plea to this charge, in Circuit Court, on September 3, 1992.
The Salt Lake County Attorney's Office later filed charges
for all three offenses. At his arraignment in Third District
Court on September 27, 1993, Strader entered a plea of not
guilty. Two months later, he filed a motion to dismiss all
charges. The court held a hearing on the motion, at which time
it dismissed the charge for false identification because the same
charge had already been prosecuted in Circuit Court the previous
year. The court declined to dismiss the remaining counts for
theft and possession of a controlled substance. The following
month, pursuant to a plea agreement, the court dismissed the
theft charge and Strader changed his plea to guilty on the
possession charge. However, Strader reserved his right to appeal
the denial of his motion to dismiss all charges pursuant to State
v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988).
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In its findings and conclusions issued March 9, 1994, the
trial court determined that Strader's act of giving false
identification to a police officer was not part of the same
criminal episode, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995),
as the other offenses of theft and possession of a controlled
substance.1 Strader now appeals from the trial court's refusal,
premised on that conclusion, to dismiss all charges.
ISSUE
Because the theft charge was ultimately dismissed as part of
the plea arrangement, the sole issue for our consideration is
whether the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge
of possession of a controlled substance, based on its
determination that the charge did not arise from the same
criminal episode as the previously prosecuted charge of giving
false identification to a police officer.2
1.
The trial court made, inter alia, the following conclusions
of law:
3. The defendant gave the false name to the
police officer before the drugs were
discovered and before the theft had been
confirmed. The defendant, by giving a false
name may have been trying to escape
apprehension by the officer but this action
did not have the same criminal objective and
was not related to the theft or the
possession of drugs.
4. The false identification to a police
officer, theft and possession of a controlled
substance charges were not part of a single
criminal episode as defined by § 76-1-401
. . . . There was not a single criminal
objective and they are [subject to] different
statutes, have different elements, would be
prosecuted by different jurisdictions and
have different penalties.
2.
For purposes of illustration and analysis, we will
nonetheless refer to the theft charge later in this opinion in
the context of examining the relationship of the three offenses
to each other. Strader also argues that the inclusion of all
three charges in a single information must be taken as an
admission by the State that all were part of a single criminal
episode. This argument is without merit and we decline to
address it. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888^-89 (Utah
1989); State v. Rancrel, 866 P.2d 607, 611 n.3 (Utah App. 1993).

940244-CA
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The "trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a
question of law," Ward v. Richfield Citv. 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah
1990), and thus is reviewed for correctness and accorded no
particular deference. See id.; Salt Lake Citv v. Emerson, 861
P.2d 443, 445 (Utah App. 1993).
ANALYSIS
1.

Applicable Law

Our starting point is the two-prong definition of "single
criminal episode" found in the Utah Criminal Code: "all conduct
which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or
an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995) (emphasis added).
If multiple offenses meet the definition of a single
criminal episode, the applicable charges must "be filed in a
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with
the highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged . . .
[and] may not be separated except by order of the court and for
good cause shown." Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5(1)(a), (b).
Additionally, there are two statutes pertinent to joinder of
offenses. If multiple charges result from the same criminal
episode, a defendant cannot be subject to separate trials "unless
the court otherwise orders to promote justice." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-402(2) (1995). If a defendant has already been prosecuted
for an offense, he or she cannot be prosecuted subsequently for
another offense arising out of the same criminal episode, so long
as the later offense "was or should have been tried under
Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution." Id. § 76-1403(1)(a). However, neither Rule 9.5 nor the referenced statutes
apply if the offenses at issue are not part of the same criminal
episode, in which case a defendant may be properly prosecuted in
separate proceedings.
2.

Scope of Analysis

Strader's appeal is somewhat atypical. It is not the usual
defendant who clamors for all pending charges against him to be
tried together before the same jury. The conventional wisdom
holds that a jury will consider a charge more fairly if untainted
by hearing the details of an entire series of charges pending

940244-CA
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against the defendant.3 In cases determining joinder issues,
defendants typically contest joinder by attempting to show the
offenses did not arise from a single criminal episode and, thus,
that their severance and separate trial motions should have been
granted.
In contesting the separate prosecution of his offenses,
Strader contends the false information offense was part of the
same episode as the theft and drug possession offenses.
Emphasizing that he claims violation of the joinder provisions
found in section 76-1-402(2), section 76-1-403(1)(a), and Rule
9.5(1) rather than a violation of the constitutional double
jeopardy doctrine, Strader argues that we should take an
expansive view in analyzing whether the multiple offenses indeed
arise from the same criminal episode. As Strader recognizes, the
opposing interpretive model is that suggested by double jeopardy
cases, in which a rather restrictive interpretation is given to
the key term "same offence." U.S. Const, amend. V. As is
hereafter explained, neither of these approaches is wholly
appropriate to Strader7s claim.
An expansive interpretation of "single criminal episode" is
appropriate in cases contesting joinder of multiple offenses.
Rule 9.5, section 76-1-402(2), and section 76-1-403(1), while
related to double jeopardy,4 expand the scope of offenses barred
from multiple trials beyond "the same offense" focus in double
jeopardy, see State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 35-36 (Utah 1987),
to all offenses arising from a "single criminal episode."5 An
expansive interpretation promotes the general joinder intent of
Rule 9.5 and relevant statutes, i.e., to avoid subjecting the

3.
Indeed, a cynic might suggest that if the three charges
would have been brought together initially, Strader would have
moved to sever, arguing that the three offenses were completely
distinct wrongs and that he would be prejudiced if they were all
tried together.
4.
Both statutes are found in Part 4 of the Criminal Code,
entitled "Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy." Strader's
counsel noted during the hearing that a double jeopardy argument
was "closely related but a different beast than the one we're
talking about here."
5.
This court has stated that cases considering whether
offenses "are separate for double jeopardy purposes" are not
applicable in single episode cases contesting the court's
decision to join offenses or deny a motion for severance. State
v. Looez. 789 P.2d 39, 44 (Utah App. 1990).
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defendant to separate trials and to promote judicial economy.
See State v, Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993); State v.
Gotfrev. 598 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1979). Also, because
appellate courts review decisions regarding joinder or severance
of offenses only for an abuse of discretion, Germonto, 868 P.2d
at 59; State v. Haaa, 735 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1987), it follows
that the reviewing court would, as a practical matter, take a
broad view of what constitutes a single criminal episode in that
context.
On the other hand, the protection against double jeopardy is
a fundamental constitutional right which prevents a defendant
from being tried more than once for the same crime. U.S. Const,
amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, § 12. Accordingly, review of a ^
double jeopardy issue employs a very narrow perspective, focusing
on whether a subsequent prosecution is for the same offense
without regard to whether multiple offenses were part of the same
criminal episode. See State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah
1985) (holding successive burglaries of different areas in one
apartment complex did not comprise the same offense); State v.
Cornish. 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per curiam) (holding car
theft and failure to stop after traffic violation were distinct
offenses not subject to double jeopardy analysis). See also
State v. James, 631 P.2d 854, 856 (Utah 1981) (holding double
jeopardy does not prevent multiple convictions for multiple
offenses arising out of single criminal episode).
On balance, the circumstances of Strader's claim place this
case closer to a double jeopardy analysis than to a joinder of
offenses analysis.7 He contends that a previous prosecution for
6.
Conversely, the trial court has discretion to order separate
proceedings for offenses arising from the same criminal episode
"to promote justice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2), and "for good
cause shown." Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5(1)(b). For example, severing
the offenses may be appropriate if joinder would unduly prejudice
a defendant and jeopardize his or her right to due process. See
State ^. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1980).
7.
Thus, the cases upon which Strader relies are unpersuasive
because they are of the genre contesting joinder. In State v.
Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993), the defendant contested
joinder of forgery with the charges of murder and robbery. The
Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court's denial of the
defendant's severance motion, held that because the forged checks
were stolen from the victim during the murder and robbery, all
three offenses had the common criminal objective of obtaining
property from the victim. Id. at 59. Other cases cited by
F
(continued...)
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one offense bars the subsequent prosecution of a different
offense because both are part of the same criminal episode. Such
a claim is comparable to asserting double jeopardy bars a
subsequent prosecution because both proceedings would involve the
same offense. Accordingly, although our focus must be on the
inherently broader term "criminal episode," in the unique posture
of defendant's case we believe it is appropriate to take a
narrow, rather than an expansive, view of what that term entails.
3. Application to Facts
As stated above, "all conduct which is closely related in
time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a
single criminal objective" comprises a single criminal episode.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1995). There is no question, nor do
the parties dispute, that both offenses pertinent here satisfied
the temporal requirement of section 76-1-401. Officer Randall
found the illegal controlled substance during a search conducted
pursuant to and immediately after Strader's arrest for giving
false identification. Accordingly, we limit our examination to
the second prong of the statutory definition of a single criminal
episode, i.e., whether the offenses for which Strader was charged
were incident to the accomplishment of the same criminal
objective.
Whether the charge for false identification was incident to
the accomplishment of the same criminal objective as the charge
for possession of a controlled substance depends on the specific
facts of the case viewed under to the totality of the
circumstances.8 Additionally, the totality of facts and
7. (...continued)
Strader are similarly inapplicable because they uphold the trial
court's decision to join offenses for trial on the rationale that
they were all part of a single criminal episode. See State v.
McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 633 (Utah 1988) (eight charges for sale of
a controlled substance); State v. Lopez. 789 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah
App. 19*90) (murder and child abuse) ; In re R.D.S. . 777 P.2d 532,
538 (Utah App 1989) (kidnapping, child abuse, and homicide),
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1990). Finally, in State v.
Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989), the Court considered "single
criminal episode" in the context of admissibility of evidence
rather than joinder or severance of offenses. Id. at 1141.
8.
The totality of circumstances approach is employed in a
variety of criminal law contexts. See; e.g.. State v. Mabe, 864
P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1993) (determining whether confession was
voluntary under totality of circumstances); State v. Case. 884
(continued...)
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circumstances is viewed objectively to determine whether there
exists a common criminal objective. It would be inappropriate to
decide the question based on whatever subjective intent the
defendant may allege for the offenses at issue. C£. State v.
Arrovo. 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah App. 1989) (categorizing "actual
state of mind of the officer" as irrelevant in determining
whether automobile stop was pretextual; objective evaluation
required instead). Finally, as explained above, in cases like
the instant one our perspective is narrow rather than expansive.
We conclude that Strader's conduct in giving the incorrect
name and a falsified drivers license to Officer Randall is not
incident to his possession of a controlled substance or, for that
matter, to his accomplishing the theft of the saw.
The only possible nexus between the crimes is an intent to
avoid arrest on the other charges by giving false identification.
Yet Strader was already detained by Officer Randall, who had
observed his involvement in what appeared to be theft activities,
at the time he gave false information. His identity was
inconsequential to his imminent arrest for theft under whatever
name he cared to use. Use of a false identity might have
deflected further problems by way of outstanding warrants,
driving on a revoked license, or other similar legal
entanglements, but it would have no bearing on the officer's
investigative focus on Strader as the perpetrator of a theft
committed in the officer's presence. Strader's suspicious
activities at the construction site and possession of drugs were
not absolved, explained, or mitigated by giving the officer his
brother's name or an obviously altered driver's license.9 Also,

8. (. ..continued)
P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (examining totality of
circumstances to determine whether articulable facts support
reasonable suspicion); City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384,
1388 (Utah App. 1994) (basing the determination of exigent
circumstances for warrantless search on totality of
circumstances).
9.
In State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (per
curiam), the Utah Supreme Court held that a crime committed to
avoid arrest for a prior crime cannot always be considered as
part of the same criminal episode. The Court later noted that
"our failure to announce that such conduct always warrants
joinder does not preclude us from concluding that under some
circumstances, joinder may be proper." State v. Germonto, 868
P.2d 50, 60 (Utah 1993).
(continued...)
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the fact he was driving a car with incorrect license plates and
that he had a forged driver's license at hand seem to indicate
that obscuring his identity was an ongoing and routine course of
conduct with Strader and not specifically done to somehow further
his theft or drug possession activities.
Objectively viewing all of the facts and circumstances in a
narrowly focused way, we conclude that because there was no
common criminal purpose, the offense of false identification and
the other offenses with which Strader was charged, in particular
the drug offense to which he pled guilty, are not part of the
same criminal episode for purposes of the issue before us.

9.

(...continued)
In the instant case, the outcome may well have been
different if the facts had created a stronger nexus of purpose
between the offenses. Consider the following two hypothetical
scenarios: In the first, Officer Randall finds a circular saw on
the back seat with a bill of sale made out to "Joe Carpenter" and
Strader tells him that his name is "Joe Carpenter." In the
second hypothetical, Officer Randall observes Strader, carrying a
circular saw, leave a construction site marked with a large sign
reading "Beagle Boys Construction." Strader tells him his name
is "Bart Beagle." In both scenarios, the false identification
would be closely connected with the alleged theft activities
because Strader, in order to evade arrest, would be using the
names as a means to explain his legitimate presence at the
construction site and/or his lawful possession of the saw. By
contrast, in the instant case, Strader's use of his brother's
identity and that of Earl Nesbitt did nothing to explain away his
apparently unlawful taking of the saw.
The drug offense is yet a further step removed from
Strades's giving false information. But for his arrest under
whatever name on theft charges, he would not have been arrested
and his car searched and the syringes found. Nonetheless, one
can envision a more purposeful connection between giving false
information and possession of a controlled substance, as in this
hypothetical situation: Officer Randall observes syringes in
Strader's car, then asks Strader for identification. Strader
produces a counterfeit police shield and introduces himself as
"Earl Nesbitt, undercover agent with the Metro Narcotics Strike
Force." In this scenario, he would employ a false identity in
order to create a legitimate reason for possessing a controlled
substance.
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CONCLUSION
For the purposes relevant here, the offense of false
identification for which Strader was prosecuted was not part of
the same criminal episode as the offense of possession of a
controlled substance because there was no common criminal
objective. Therefore, sections 76-1-402(2) and -403(1) do not
bar the subsequent prosecution proceedings in district court.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Gregory^K. Orme, Presiding Judge

I CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, £*foge

DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge (concurring in result):
In my view, the Scope of Analysis section of the main
opinion is not only unnecessary to the result but analytically
flawed. Strader is seeking to avail himself of the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 to -405 (1990); he is not claiming
that he was "twice put in jeopardy" within the meaning
of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1
Moreover, Strader7s reliance upon cases in which the
defendant is contesting joinder is totally appropriate. There is
nothing in the statutes upon which Strader relies that suggests
an "expansive" interpretation where the government is pursuing
joinder or a "very narrow perspective" where the defendant is
attempting to benefit from the statutory provisions.2 Thus, the
majority's application of a double standard for interpreting the
definition of a single criminal episode set out in section 76-1401 is unnecessarily confusing, especially where, as here, either
1.

See note four of the main opinion.

2.
Even if it is assumed that such an approach i^ appropriate
to an analysis at the constitutional level.
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interpretation would yield the same result. See State v.
Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, 59-60 (Utah 1993) (applying "expansive"
interpretation, yet requiring nonetheless, as in the case at bar,
that the theory for joinder "posit[] a single objective
throughout the whole [criminal] episode") (emphasis added)•
As stated in the terse, straightforward analysis in the
Application to Facts section of the main opinion, Strader's crime
of giving false information to a police officer is simply not
part of a single criminal episode involving the theft and drug
offenses under the definition set out in section 76-1-401.
Therefore, it is unnecessary to meld a constitutional analysis
with statutory interpretation, even if that exercise were
logipemySuggested by the statute.

ssociate Presiding Judge
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